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Abstract 
 
The study examines the practice of employing multiple compensation consultants. Examining 
data of a sample of UK companies over the period 2003–2006 we find that CEOs receive 
higher equity-based pay when firms employ more than one compensation consultant. An 
increase in the number of compensation consultants is also associated with an increase in 
CEO equity-based pay, whereas no decline in CEO pay takes place when firms reduce the 
number of pay consultants. We also observe that the market shares of compensation 
consultant are positively related to CEO equity-based pay. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The adoption of compensation consultants in the executive pay setting process has become a 
widespread practice in the corporate world. These consultants are frequently hired by a firm’s 
compensation/remuneration committee which is responsible for the design of Chief Executive 
Officer’s (CEO) pay package. The consultants do not only offer advices on whether to pay 
with bonus, options, shares, etc., but also on how much each compensation component should 
be. On the one hand, they are viewed as provider of useful services and helping firms to 
achieve optimal compensation contracting (Conyon, Peck and Sadler, 2009). On the other 
hand, there is also a strand of literature that views pay consultants as helping firms to justify 
higher pay awards (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Looking from the critical management 
perspective, Ogden and Watson (2012) argue that pay consultants facilitate firms to attract 
and retain executives of the appropriate quality, experience and skills that are necessary to 
achieve business success for the firms. 
 
Recent studies document that a vast majority of listed firms in the US and the UK employ 
compensation consultants. Interestingly, studies find that CEOs of these firms receive higher 
pay relative to those who do not employ any pay consultant (Conyon et al., 2009; Murphy and 
Sandino, 2010; Cadman, Carter and Hillegeist, 2010; Goh and Gupta, 2010; Voulgaris, 
Stathopoulos and Walker, 2010; Armstrong, Ittner and Larcker, 2012). A notable 
phenomenon that remains unexplored is that many firms seek recommendations from not just 
one but several compensation consultants (Conyon et al., 2009; Murphy and Sandino, 2010). 
While studies have put forward conflicting arguments about the role of compensation 
consultants, none has explicitly investigated (primarily because of lack of publicly available 
data) how firms’ CEOs have benefited from employing more than one compensation 
consultant. The main purpose of our study is to conduct an empirical investigation of this 
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question. This is an intriguing issue knowing that these consultants do not come cheap. The 
study also explores how CEOs of firms have benefited from employing compensation 
consultant with large market shares. 
 
We examine compensation consultants employed by a sample of UK listed firms. Our study is 
of particular interest because each and every firm in our sample uses at least one pay 
consultant and more than half of these firms employ multiple consultants. Although prior 
studies (e.g. Cadman et al., 2010; Conyon et al., 2009; Voulgaris et al. 2010) have examined 
whether firms with compensation consultants pay their CEOs more relative to those who do 
not employ any pay consultant, we are not aware of any study that has specifically 
investigated the practice of employing multiple compensation consultants. 
 
Another distinct feature of our study is that we analyze data covering several consecutive 
years (2003–2006) whilst prior studies have examined compensation consultant data for only 
one year [Goh and Gupta (2010) is the only exception]. In contrast to US firms which had to 
disclose consultant related information with effect from December 2006, UK firms started 
providing this information several years earlier. We also examine how CEO pay changes 
when firms decide to increase or reduce the number of consultants from one year to another. 
 
A number of important findings emerge from our analysis. First, we observe significantly 
higher equity-based pay for CEOs of firms that rely on more than one compensation 
consultants. These findings hold after controlling for firm, corporate governance and CEO 
characteristics. Second, we find that an increase in the number of compensation consultants is 
associated with an increase in equity-based compensation. But, there is no corresponding 
decline in CEO compensation when firms reduce the number of pay consultants. Third, we 
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find that the market share of compensation consultants is positively related to client firm’s 
CEO pay.  
 
One may be tempting to argue that pay consultants may have intentionally advised towards 
higher CEO pay in order to secure their business interests with the client firm. Alternatively, 
higher CEO pay may also reflect the unintended outcome of competition among pay 
consultants. However, it is also important to understand the complexities of the pressures and 
processes confronting pay consultants in the determination of CEO pay. The critical 
management perspective indicates that advising towards higher pay could be a beneficial 
strategy to facilitate firms to secure executives of the appropriate quality, experience and 
skills. Furthermore, equity-based pay such as stock options can be efficient in matching 
managerial pay and ability (Arya and Mittendorf, 2005). Therefore, the observed increase in 
equity-based compensation in the presence of multiple consultants may suggest that pay 
consultants were competing in facilitating firms to attract executives with the right talents by 
advising towards higher equity-based pay. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant studies and 
outlines two research questions. Section 3 describes the research method which is then 
followed by description of data in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results of the 
study. Section 6 discusses the findings of the study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. The number of compensation consultants and CEO pay 
Murphy and Sandino (2010) find that 17% of US firms use two or more compensation 
consultants. Conyon et al. (2009) report that while the majority of US firms use only one 
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compensation consultant, UK firms often use more than one pay consultant. Goh and Gupta 
(2010) confirm that more than 40% of UK firms employ two or more consultants during a 
reporting year. None of these studies has explicitly investigated how firms’ CEOs have 
benefited from employing more than one compensation consultant.  
 
Although there is no legal requirement for firms to disclose the costs of employing 
compensation consultants, anecdotal evidence suggests that these consultants do not come 
cheap. British press reported that consultants charged about £500 - £800 an hour for their 
services.1 Murphy and Sandino (2010) observe that the average pay consulting fee paid in 
2006 for a sample of Canadian companies was almost US$90,000. If a consultant does not 
come cheap, then the astounding question is: why some firms use two or more pay 
consultants? How firms benefit from employing multiple pay consultants? 
 
The practice of employing compensation consultants has been under academic scrutiny for 
many years (Wade, Porac and Pollock, 1997). The role of compensation consultants can be 
analyzed in the context of three theoretical perspectives on executive pay, namely: efficient or 
optimal contracting theory, rent extraction or managerial power theory, and resource 
dependency theory. According to the efficient or optimal contracting view, compensation 
consultants provide expert advice and useful information that help the Board of Directors to 
design an optimal structure of executive compensation so that greater manager-shareholder 
interest alignment can take place (Conyon et al., 2009). In this context, the compensation 
consultant is deemed to act in the best interest of shareholders. Some researchers view that 
compensation consultants provide independent recommendations and a variety of pay related 
proprietary information to firms. Using the efficient contracting view of executive pay, 
                                                 
1 For example, see, ‘Get me an above-average pay consultant’, The Mail on Sunday (February 6, 2005), and ‘Pay 
consultants are next in line for a pummelling’, The Sunday Times (March 8, 2009).  
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Conyon et al. (2009) argue that consultants can help remuneration committees to design an 
appropriate level and structure of CEO compensation that can align the interests of CEOs with 
those of shareholders. 
 
Bender (2011) suggests that firms benefit from employing multiple consultants because 
different compensation consultants specialize in different aspects of pay. The following 
excerpt from the Annual Report (2005) of Aggreko plc illustrates the argument: “…Towers 
Perrin provided remuneration with respect to basic salary, bonus plans and executive long-
term incentive plans. New Bridge Consultants provided advice on the implementation and 
administration of share plans. Mercer Human Resource Consulting provided advice on 
retirement benefits in the UK and overseas and administers the UK defined-benefit pension 
scheme.” Bender (2011) also observes that the management team and the remuneration 
committee of a firm may not be advised by the same pay consultant which means more than 
one consultant may give their views on the same aspect of pay to help different parties within 
the firm determining an optimal level of executive pay. 
 
On the other hand, according to the rent extraction or managerial power view (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003), compensation consultants have strong incentives to help CEOs in receiving 
higher pay in order to ensure continuity of the consultants’ business relationships with client 
firms. This view holds if CEOs can use their power to select and appoint those consultants 
who looked after their personal welfare. Such rent extraction behavior is plausible when 
Board of Directors operates under the influence of CEOs (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).  
 
Further, Crystal (1991) observes that whenever a CEO is paid above the average, the 
company will be under pressure to provide a justification of it. Wade et al. (1997) argue that a 
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firm’s remuneration committee will usually validate high levels of executive compensation by 
citing a compensation consultant as an advisor in the pay-setting process. It follows that firms 
can create even a better impression to the outside world when they demonstrate that the 
decision on CEO compensation has been made diligently by seeking advice from different 
consultants. Likewise, one may also argue that employing multiple compensation consultants 
can provide better camouflage for CEOs to extract rent through higher pay without having to 
experience public outrage. Anecdotal evidence also indicates that remuneration committees 
favor seeking advice from several compensation consultants in order to find the highest rate 
of pay for CEOs.2 
 
However, Ogden and Watson (2012) argue that the managerial power arguments may have 
significant limitations in conceptualizing the role of pay consultants. There is a potential that 
pay consultants may not be sensitive to the expectations of shareholders about pay decisions. 
Adopting the resource dependency theory, Ogden and Watson (2012) posit that pay 
consultants can facilitate firms’ remuneration consultants to attract and retain executives with 
the required talents to run the underlying firms successfully. They observe that although 
remuneration committees were anxious to adopt a conservative approach towards executive 
pay, they were also eager to ensure that CEOs receive compensation that is consistent with 
external benchmarks. The compensation consultants typically brought in benchmarking data 
on pay to advise client firms’ remuneration committees. 
 
Based on 1992–1995 data of 199 large UK companies, Ezzamel and Watson (2002) find that 
the benchmarking process (facilitated by compensation consultants) has resulted in a 
‘bidding-up’ of CEO pay. The bidding up of CEO pay may not necessarily provide a negative 
                                                 
2 The Sunday Telegraph (Jan. 4, 2004): ‘UK companies splurge on pay consultants’.  
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connotation in the presence of competition among firms for managerial talents. The 
financialization literature on pay suggests that equity-based pay such as stock options are 
efficient in matching managerial pay and talent. For example, Arya and Mittendorf (2005, p. 
189) suggest that, “If a manager wants to overstate his worth to the firm, he must naturally 
also overstate the firm’s worth with him at the helm. As a result, the firm offers a generous 
package of stock options in lieu of cash for assertions of high ability. Since both the 
likelihood of option exercise and firm value in the event of exercise are tied to managerial 
ability, only a gifted manager takes such a gamble.” Taking the resource dependency theory 
and financialization perspective in combination may imply that there can be a tendency for 
pay consultants to advise their client firms towards offering higher equity-based pay for 
CEOs. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether CEOs receive higher compensation 
when firms employ multiple pay consultants.  
 
2.2. Market share of compensation consultants and CEO pay 
Whilst some studies suggest that compensation consultants can help firms in designing 
optimal pay contracts for CEOs (Conyon et al., 2009) or assist firms in attracting CEOs with 
required talents (Ogden and Watson, 2012), other studies acknowledge the fact that 
compensation consultants do not act independently and suffer from severe conflicts of 
interests (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Cadman et al., 2010; Murphy and Sandino, 2010). They 
tend to pursue CEOs’ interests especially when they are under the impression that CEOs can 
influence the decision to hire them as in the case when firms’ boards are captured by CEOs 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). 
 
Compensation consultants also provide various non-compensation related lucrative services to 
firms (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Cadman et al., 2010; Murphy and Sandino; 2010). These 
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services include providing consultancy on human resource management, internal control, 
insurance, financial and risk management. Logically, consultants compete for both 
compensation and non-compensation related businesses. But, conflicts of interests arise when 
compensation consultants aim to secure additional (non-compensation related) businesses 
with the client firm. Apart from seeking additional businesses, they would want to ensure the 
continuity of pay consulting business with the existing client firm. Obviously, there is a 
continuing pressure on them to ‘win work’. Because of the fear of losing pay consulting 
business to other entrants, these consultants are in essence betrothed in a competition. Among 
firms employing only one compensation consultant, there is an inherent rivalry from other 
consultants to attract new business opportunities whereas among firms with multiple 
consultants, the contest is also towards retaining the existing business. In the presence of 
competition, they are careful not to displease client firm CEOs especially when they were 
under the impression that these CEOs can influence the decision to hire them (Crystal, 1991). 
 
Studies also report that compensation consultants cannot advise openly and critically on CEO 
pay. Crystal (1991) observes that if a consultant’s recommendation does not cause the CEO to 
earn more money, the consultant risks losing business with the client firm. Similarly, Bebchuk 
and Fried (2003) argue that a recommendation from compensation consultant that displeases a 
CEO may risk the consultant’s future relationships with the firm. The prospect of lucrative 
business interests incentivize compensation consultants to compete intensely with each other.3 
Although Bebchuk and Fried (2003) do not explicitly mention competition among pay 
consultants, the prediction that an incumbent consultant might lose business to other 
                                                 
3 It is also logical to expect that competition among consultants is greater in firms employing multiple 
consultants than in firms employing a single consultant. For example, if a firm employs two or more consultants 
at a time, it is relatively less costly for the firm to fire a consultant and transfer its business/job to another 
consultant. In case of a firm employing one consultant, it has to incur searching cost to find a new consultant to 
replace a terminated consultant. The potential searching cost facing a firm with single consultant would create 
less competitive environment for such consultant. 
9 
 
consultants implicitly refers to the presence of competition. To ensure their continuity in 
business, the incumbent consultants need to recommend CEO pay to a level higher than that 
could possibly be recommended by other competing consultants.  
 
Therefore, the second line of inquiry we intend to pursue is the following: if all consultants 
are expected to be competing with each other in order to increase their market shares by 
proposing higher CEO pay for their clients’ firms, we would then observe that higher CEO 
compensation is associated with those consultants with larger market shares. 
 
3. Research Methods 
3.1. The number of compensation consultants and CEO pay 
To address the first research question, we initially perform a bivariate analysis and examine 
the simple relationship between compensation consultants and CEO compensation. Firms are 
classified according to the total number of compensation consultants used. For each category 
of firms, we then examine the level of CEO compensation. This descriptive analysis provides 
an overview of whether CEO compensation increases when the number of compensation 
consultants employed by a firm increases. 
 
Then we proceed to a multivariate analysis that controls for a variety of firm-specific, CEO-
specific and corporate governance determinants of pay (Conyon et al., 2009; Murphy and 
Sandino, 2010; Cadman et al., 2010). First, we investigate if the use of multiple compensation 
consultants is associated with higher CEO pay. We estimate an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression model which is written as follows: 
jttj
n
jtnjt
jt
ControlsCon
Pay
  
2
1
    (1) 
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As a robustness check, we also perform panel data regressions to supplement the analysis of 
pooled OLS regressions. The dependent variable Payjt in (1) above refers to compensation 
received by the CEO of company j at time t. It is defined in several ways. One is the total 
annual compensation which is made up of the following components: salary, bonus, benefit4, 
pension increment, and values of stock grants and stock option grants. The pension increment 
is derived from the difference between the actuarial values of defined benefit pension from 
two consecutive years. The value of stock grants is measured as the value of the equity 
discounted at 20% to reflect its performance-contingent character. The Black-Scholes-Merton 
value of stock option is employed to approximate the value of stock options. The other ways 
of defining Payjt are by considering the amount of equity-based compensation (the value of 
stock grants and stock option grants) as well as variable compensation (sum of bonus, shares 
and stock option grants, and pension increment).5 The explanatory variable Conjt is the total 
number of compensation consultants used by firm j at time t. As a robustness check, we also 
use another approach whereby a dummy variable is constructed that equals one if a firm uses 
two (three) or more consultants, and zero otherwise. 
 
We use a variety of control variables that are commonly found in the literature to be the key 
determinants of executive compensation. These include firm characteristics (firm 
performance, firm size), CEO characteristics (age, tenure) and corporate governance 
characteristics (institutional ownership, CEO duality, board size, non-executive directors, size 
of remuneration committee). All these variables are defined in the Appendix. For ease of 
comparison with prior studies, we use annual stock return as the measure of firm performance 
                                                 
4 This refers mainly to benefits such as car allowance and insurance premium paid on behalf of CEOs. 
5 The results from variable pay are similar to those of total pay. Therefore, these results are not reported in the 
paper but are available from the authors upon request. 
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(Brick et al., 2006).6 The regression analysis also includes additional controls for industry 
( j ) and year ( t ). The remaining term in specification (1), εjt, is an idiosyncratic error term.  
 
3.2. Market share of compensation consultants and CEO pay 
Our second research question is concerned with the association between compensation 
consultant’s market share and CEO pay. The estimated regression model is written as follows: 
jttj
n
jtnjt
jt
ControlseMarketShar
Pay
  
2
1
  (2) 
 
As before, the variable Payjt refers to the compensation received by the CEO of firm j at time 
t. The explanatory variable MarketSharejt represents the market share of a compensation 
consultant. The correct procedure to compute market share is to relate one firm with one 
consultant. This is because when firms use multiple consultants, it is not obvious which 
consultant has the greatest influence in determining CEO compensation. Therefore, we 
perform the empirical analysis using those firms that employ only one compensation 
consultant. Market share is estimated as the number of client firms served divided by the total 
number of compensation consulting contracts in the market.7 To assess the robustness of 
empirical results, we also identify the two leading compensation consultants (on the basis of 
market share greater than 10%) and estimate their isolated effects on CEO compensation. 
Similar to previous regression analysis, specification (2) also includes various firm, CEO and 
corporate governance characteristics as control variables. 
 
                                                 
6 We also use another performance variable, return on assets, as part of robustness check. It is calculated as the 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. 
7 A better proxy to estimate market share could be to use the amount of fees received from the compensation 
consulting business. Unfortunately, this type of proprietary information is not publicly available in the UK. 
Instead, we assume that the fee is proportional to client firm’s sales and create an alternate, albeit less precise, 
proxy variable by multiplying the initially estimated market share by sales. 
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4. Data 
 
With the introduction of Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations in 2002, UK listed 
firms are required to disclose the name of entity that provides advice or service in the 
executive pay setting process. This information is hand-collected from company annual 
reports. We obtain a sample of 251 non-financial UK FTSE 350 firms covering the period 
2003–2006. We find that all but six companies with the available data employ at least one 
compensation consultant during these years. Due to non-availability of annual reports, 
mergers and acquisitions, etc., the final sample comprises 175 companies. The sample firms 
are spread over several industrial sectors. The largest number of companies (68 firms) belongs 
to the manufacturing sector, followed by transportation & communication sector (20 firms) 
and wholesale & retail trade sector (19 firms). 
 
Detailed CEO compensation data are also hand-collected from the director remuneration 
report section of firms’ annual reports. This process involves collection of information on 
almost all disclosed components of CEO compensation: salary, bonus, stock grants, option 
grants, pension and other benefits. Data on CEO characteristics and governance variables are 
also hand-collected from annual reports, while those on firm characteristics are collected from 
Datastream. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1. Firm level statistics are 
presented in Panel A while those on compensation consultants are presented in Panel B. There 
are 700 observations related to 175 companies covering the four-year period 2003–2006. The 
mean (median) CEO annual compensation is £1.94 million (£1.40 million). The average 
equity-based compensation (stock and option grants) is about £0.73 million, representing 
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about 38% of total pay. When cash bonus and pensions are added with equity-based pay, the 
average CEO variable compensation increases to £1.36 million. This is about 70% of total 
compensation. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
The average annual stock return for sample firms is 14% (median is 17%). Sales, which is a 
measure of firm size, have an average (median) of £4.4 billion (£1.3 billion). Firm risk is 
measured by the volatility of monthly stock returns. We find that the average volatility of 
stock returns during the four years is equal to 33% (median 32%). Each firm in the sample 
employs at least one compensation consultant. We observe that, on average, there are two 
compensation consultants per firm. One firm used up to eight compensation consultants. 
Examining the board of directors, we find that the average UK firm has 10 board members. 
The median firm has equal number of executives and non-executives. The Board of the retail 
company Morrisons had no non-executive member in 2003. Every sample firm has a 
remuneration committee. The average firm has four members in this committee.8 The average 
CEO is 53 years old and has worked as CEO in the company for six years. 
 
The frequency distribution of pay consultants used by sample firms is presented in Panel B of 
Table 1. We observe that 311 (44.4%) firm-years have one compensation consultant whilst 
the rest 389 (55.6%) use multiple compensation consultants. Of those firms employing more 
than one pay consultant, we find that 29.0%, 16.1%, 7.6% and 2.9% of firms use two, three, 
four and more than four consultants, respectively. Our findings are similar to Conyon et al. 
(2009) who find that 28% of their sample firms use two compensation consultants and 16% 
use three consultants. Voulgaris et al. (2010) report that one-third of FTSE 100 and one-
quarter of FTSE 250 firms in a reporting year employ multiple compensation consultants. 
                                                 
8 The remuneration committee of Morrisons consists of three executive members. Diageo had eight remco 
members in 2004 and 2006. 
14 
 
Goh and Gupta (2010) also confirm that the use of multiple consultants has become a 
common practice in the UK. In a comparative analysis, Conyon et al. (2009) observe that 
most US firms use only one pay consultant. 
 
We count the total number of compensation consultants used by sample firms in the UK and 
find that these firms have employed 83 different compensation consultants during the four-
year period. A similar pattern is documented by Goh and Gupta (2010) who report more than 
70 different consultants in the UK, and by Murphy and Sandino (2010) who document 72 
different consulting firms in the USA. While most firms use the same number of pay 
consultants each year, some firms also change their consultants from one year to another. We 
observe that during 2003–2006 an increase in the number of consultants took place in 93 
cases, whereas a decline occurred in 82 cases. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Although a large number of compensation consultants provide services to client firms, the 
market is quite concentrated as only a few consultants have dominated the industry. Panel B 
of Table 1 shows the six leading executive compensation consultants used in the UK. These 
are the consultants with more than five per cent market share. The most frequently used 
consultant is the New Bridge Street. It captures about 17.9% of the total pay consulting 
contracts, followed closely by its rival consultant, Towers Perrin (15.1%). The rest are Mercer 
(7.6% each), Monks (6.9%), Watson Wyatt (6.4%) and Deloitte (6.4%).9 These six leading 
consultant firms take up about 60.3% of the total compensation consulting businesses in the 
UK. With the exception of Deloitte, similar big five consultants are identified in the UK by 
Conyon et al. (2009). According to Murphy and Sandino (2010), the big six consultants in the 
US include Towers Perrin, Mercer, Watson Wyatt and Deloitte, and capture more than two-
                                                 
9 New Bridge Street joined with Hewitt in 2008 to form Hewitt New Bridge Street whereas Towers Perrin 
merged with Watson Wyatt in 2009 to form Towers Watson. 
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thirds of the total pay consulting contracts offered in 2006. Cadman et al. (2010) also 
document a similar picture. The Herfindahl index, calculated as the sum of the market shares 
squared, is 0.073. It confirms a high degree of competition facing the pay consulting business. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. The number of compensation consultants and CEO pay 
In analyzing the relationship between multiple compensation consultants and CEO 
compensation, we first perform a simple bivariate analysis. The sample firms are categorized 
according to the number of compensation consultants used and the average (median) pay is 
then calculated for each category. The results are presented in Table 2 (Panel A). 
 
For firms employing only one compensation consultant, the average CEO total compensation 
is £1.658 million (median = £1.239 million). When firms with two consultants are considered, 
we observe an increase, albeit statistically insignificant, in total pay (mean = £1.779 million, 
median = $1.391 million). The positive trend in CEO pay with an increase in the number of 
pay consultants continues further. The median CEO total compensation increases to £1.583 
million when firms use three different consultants instead of two consultants. The change is 
statistically significant (z-statistic = 2.19). A statistically significant increase in CEO equity-
based and variable pay is also observed when firms use three different consultants instead of 
two consultants. When firms using more than four consultants, the mean total pay 
significantly increases to £4.071 million (t-statistic = 1.80) whereas the median CEO pay 
significantly increases to £3.615 million (z-statistic = 2.04). A statistically significant increase 
in CEO salary is also observed when firms use more than four compensation consultants. 
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In Panel B of Table 2, we look at the year-to-year change in compensation consultants and the 
associated change in CEO compensation. For 350 firm-years, there is no increase or decrease 
in the total number of consultants firms used. We do not find a significant change in annual 
compensation when the total number of consultants used by a firm remains the same. We also 
find that when a firm adds an additional consultant (as in the case of 93 firm-years), the 
average (median) total compensation increases by 8.5% (4.4%). Both equity-based pay and 
variable pay show a significant increase and there is a significant increase in the median of 
salary too. On the other hand, when firms reduce the number of compensation consultants (as 
in the case of 82 firm-years), there is no statistically significant change in CEO compensation. 
 
Next, we perform multivariate regression analysis to examine if the level of annual 
compensation changes when firms employ multiple pay consultants.10 The natural logarithm 
of equity-based and total compensation of CEOs are used as the dependent variables. The 
main explanatory variable is the total number of compensation consultants used by a firm.11 
We first run regressions using the natural logarithm of the total number of consultants and 
present the results in Table 3. As an alternate to this continuous variable, we use indicator 
variables that are equal to one for firms with two, three or more consultants, and zero 
otherwise.12 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
The results show that the use of multiple consultants is significantly related to equity-based 
compensation. The regression coefficients of the variable representing the total number of 
                                                 
10 Before we perform the regressions, we estimate the correlation coefficients among key variables. Overall, the 
estimated correlations are relatively small. We check for the possibility of serious multicollinearity problem and 
find that it is negligible (the variance inflations factors in the regression estimations are much less than 10). The 
correlation matrix is available upon request. 
11 The use of proportions of variable pay and equity pay mix as the dependent variable does not materially 
change our results. Examining whether CEO compensation is lower for firms without consultants is not 
meaningful here because we find only six FTSE350 non-financial firms did not use pay consultant. These six 
firms were excluded from our sample. 
12 Because these results are not different from those presented in the paper, we do not report them. 
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compensation consultants (i.e., ‘consultants’ variable) are positive and statistically significant 
for both pooled regression (column 1) and the random effects regression (column 2).13 The 
results indicate that equity-based compensation increases as the number of pay consultants 
increases.  
 
When total compensation is used as the dependent variable, the results of which are presented 
in columns (3) and (4), we observe that although the estimated coefficients of the 
‘consultants’ variable are positive, these are statistically insignificant. In unreported 
regressions, we also examine variable compensation and find a similar result. On the basis of 
these findings, we conclude that the practice of employing multiple consultants is associated 
with significantly higher equity-based compensation. It can be gathered from Table 1 earlier 
that the average equity-based pay (£0.73 million) represents a significant portion (38%) of 
average total pay (£1.94 million). This pay component is made up of stock grants and stock 
options for which its values tend to vary more across firms than the values of other pay 
components, hence requires firms to seek advices from more than one consultant in order to 
make informed decisions. 
 
The above relationship between CEO compensation and the total number of compensation 
consultants employed by a firm is examined using a variety of control variables representing 
firm, corporate governance and CEO characteristics. Many of these variables exhibit 
statistically significant effects in the expected direction. For example, we find that variables 
like stock return (a measure of firm performance) and firm size positively affect CEO pay. 
These are indeed a stylized fact documented in the executive compensation literature 
                                                 
13 The result of Hausman test shows that the random effects model rather than the fixed effects model is more 
appropriate for the data we use. 
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(Cadman et al., 2010; Murphy and Sandino, 2010; Brick et al., 2006).14 We find that the 
coefficients of board size are significantly positive. The result suggests that firms with larger 
boards pay their CEOs more. The finding is consistent with the argument that a larger board is 
less effective and more susceptible to the influence of the CEO (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 
2008). We also observe that CEO duality has a significant influence on lowering executive 
compensation. This is not surprising because the incidence of CEO duality is common among 
founder-CEO managed firms in the UK. We find that the longer a CEO holds the position in a 
firm, the higher is the pay. The finding is consistent with the literature because CEO with a 
longer tenure is rewarded with higher pay for possessing more valuable human capital (Brick 
et al., 2006). 
 
The analysis above involves estimations with the total number of compensation consultants 
employed by a firm. We next examine whether CEO compensation is related to change in the 
number of pay consultants. We therefore split the sample into three categories of firms 
representing increase, decrease and no change in the number of pay consultants from one year 
to another. These different categories are estimated as individual dummy variables (dummy 
equals one if there in an increase, decrease, or no change in the number of consultants used, 
and zero otherwise). The estimated regression results are presented in Table 4. 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
We observe that an increase in the number of consultants leads to an increase in both CEO 
equity-based compensation (columns 1 and 2) and total compensation (columns 3 and 4). The 
estimated coefficients of the variable called as ‘increase in consultants’ are positive and 
statistically significant. Interestingly, we also observe that when firms reduce the number of 
pay consultants, there is no corresponding reduction in CEO pay. In unreported regressions, 
                                                 
14 Sales are commonly adopted in studies to proxy for firm size (Conyon et al., 2009; Murphy and Sandino, 
2010). There is no change in the results when total assets is used as another proxy for firm size. 
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we take the first differences of several explanatory variables and also obtain consistent 
findings. The results presented here complement the earlier findings reported in Table 3 
showing that the use of multiple compensation consultants is associated with an increase in 
CEO equity-based pay.15 
 
5.2. Market share of compensation consultants and CEO pay 
We now proceed to examine the empirical relation between the market shares of 
compensation consultants and the client firm’s CEO pay. Table 5 reports these results.16 
Pooled regression results examining equity-based compensation and total compensation are 
presented in columns (1) and (3). We observe that the regression coefficients of the market 
share variable are positive and statistically significant. The random effects regressions results 
presented in columns (2) and (4) show that the coefficients of market share variable are still 
positive, but not significant. The statistical significance of these coefficients may well be 
underestimated due to the use of a small unbalanced panel dataset (i.e., 311 firm-years). 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
The results document some evidence that greater market share of compensation consultants is 
associated with higher client firm’s CEO pay. The rent extraction theory indicates that pay 
consultants have a strong incentive to serve the interest of CEOs in order to retain their pay 
consulting business with client firms. The likelihood of losing business with the client firm is 
greater if the compensation consultant does not act in favor of the CEO when they were under 
the impression that the CEOs can influence the decision to hire them. Therefore, one may 
                                                 
15 In a robustness analysis, we examine if an increase or decrease in the number of pay consultants is related to 
percentage change in annual compensation. These results are quite similar, and therefore, are not presented 
separately. We also examine if an arriving pay consultant relates to an increase in CEO pay. Focusing on firms 
employing one consultant, we observe that only 40 firm-years experience a change in pay consultant. Although 
the estimated regression coefficients of the change in consultant variable are positive, these are statistically 
insignificant, perhaps due to the small number of observations. 
16 As mentioned earlier, the market share of compensation consultant is calculated using firms with only one 
consultant. This procedure, on the one hand, allows to clearly identify the share of each consultant; on the other 
hand, it leads to a reduction in the number of firm-year observations (311). The regressions reported here include 
the statistically significant control variables only. 
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argue that consultant will advise for higher CEO pay in order to maintain or even increase its 
market share. This implies that client firm’s CEO pay moves in tandem with the market share 
of pay consultant (as indicated in Table 5). As Bebchuk and Fried (2003) have argued: 
“Providing advice that hurts the CEO’s pocketbook is hardly a way to enhance the 
consultant’s chances of being hired in the future by this firm or, indeed, by any other firms”. 
 
We perform an additional analysis whereby the effects of two leading pay consultants (New 
Bridge Street and Towers Perrin) are isolated.17 Dummy variables are used to identify each 
consultant. As before, firm, corporate governance and CEO-specific control variables are 
included in the regressions. The results are presented in Table 6. Columns (1) and (4) show 
results for New Bridge Street while columns (2) and (5) for Towers Perrin. We also estimate 
regressions using specifications that include both consultants jointly (columns 3 and 6). 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
The main finding from Table 6 is that CEO pay is significantly higher when the client firm 
receives advice from New Bridge Street and Towers Perrin. Most of the estimated consultant 
dummy coefficients are positive; only two coefficients are statistically insignificant. If 
compensation consultants compete by way of advising towards greater pay for the client 
firm’s CEO, it is unsurprising to observe this tendency of leading consultants being associated 
with greater CEO pay.18 Anecdotal evidence also provides support to this finding: “…there is 
a clear link between companies with controversial remuneration practices and their pay 
consultants…A recent survey found that, together with its larger US rival Towers Perrin, New 
Bridge had effectively cornered the market...”19 
 
                                                 
17 We restrict to two pay consultants because the market shares of other consultants are below 10% and these are 
used by a smaller number of firms.  
18 The model specifications used here implicitly assume that both New Bridge Street and Towers Perrin get 
employed by firms with similar firm characteristics. 
19 The Mail (February 6, 2005): ‘Get me an above-average pay consultant’. 
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One can argue that larger firms that normally pay their CEOs more tend to employ 
compensation consultants with greater market share. We therefore examine the choice of the 
two leading compensation consultants (i.e. Towers Perrin and New Bridge Street) by using 
the logistic regression approach. The results show that firms which pay their CEOs more tend 
to employ Towers Perrin and New Bridge Street, but there is no statistical support for the 
conjecture that larger firms mostly receive recommendations from these two leading 
consultants.20 
 
5.3. Additional robustness analysis 
The empirical findings presented above on the association of CEO pay with compensation 
consultants and their market shares may be subject to the endogeneity problem. The number 
of compensation consultants can be an endogenous choice variable that most likely depends 
on factors like firm size, firm risk, remuneration committee members, etc. Similarly, the 
market share of compensation consultants and CEO pay can be simultaneously determined. 
The consequence is that the results reported so far could be biased. Many studies use the two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regression method to tackle the endogeneity issue (e.g. Sun et al., 
2009). Therefore, we conduct a new analysis using the number of compensation consultants 
and their market share as endogenous variables, and estimate the following two-equation 
system: 
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20 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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At first, we consider the number of compensation consultants as an endogenous choice 
variable and explain it by using factors like firm size, firm risk, size of the remuneration 
committee and CEO characteristics like age and tenure. The fitted values of the consultant 
variable are then used to explain CEO compensation. Two variables: size of the remuneration 
committee and firm risk are used as instrumental variables.21 The CEO compensation 
regression includes other control variables like stock return, board size and CEO duality. As 
before, we analyze both equity-based compensation and total compensation. 
 
The estimation results are presented in Table 7 (columns 1 – 3). The first column explains the 
firm’s choice of number of consultants. The regression result shows that larger and more risky 
firms are the ones which employ multiple consultants. Firms with larger remuneration 
committees also seek advice from higher number of pay consultants. On the other hand, firms 
with higher institutional share ownership and higher tenure of CEOs tend to have lesser 
number of compensation consultants. Columns (2) and (3) present the second-stage results of 
equity and total compensation. We observe that the coefficient of compensation consultant 
variable is positive and statistically significant. The results also show that the multiple 
consultant variable is significantly related to both equity-based and total CEO compensation. 
These new results reinforce our conclusion that CEO pay increases when firms rely on a 
higher number of compensation consultants. 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
In the second part of the analysis, we examine if CEO compensation is related to the market 
share of consultants. The first-stage regression considers market share as the endogenous 
variable; the predicted values are then used in the second-stage to explain CEO pay. Columns 
(4) to (6) of Table 7 exhibit the results. We find that market share is significant positively 
                                                 
21 The OLS results presented earlier in Tables 4-7 indicate that these two variables are not significantly related to 
CEO compensation. 
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related to equity-based compensation and total compensation of CEOs. The 2SLS results are 
consistent with those obtained earlier from pooled and random effects regressions. 
 
The positive relationship between CEO pay and the number of compensation consultants or 
their market shares could be driven by the firm's compensation contract itself. Firms with 
higher CEO pay contract may need to hire more compensation consultants and high 
reputation consultants (i.e., those with large market shares) for higher CEO pay justification. 
Therefore, we perform a robustness check by including lagged CEO pay in the first-stage 
regressions. Although the lagged analysis reduces the number of observations (and statistical 
significance), the main finding remains qualitatively similar to previous analyses.22 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Compensation consultants are central to the CEO pay setting process but their role is currently 
understudied worldwide. Conyon et al. (2009) and Cadman et al. (2010) proclaim that little 
scientific evidence exists about the influence of compensation consultant on executive pay. 
Three competing views on the role of compensation consultants are presented both in the 
media as well as in the academic literature. On the one hand, compensation consultants are 
regarded as professional experts. They help firms to achieve optimal contracting by offering a 
valuable service without which executive compensation cannot be appropriately designed. On 
the other hand, the managerial power perspective asserts that compensation consultants do not 
act independently of the influence of firm’s executives. Consultants are assumed to have 
strong incentives to advocate higher executive pay in order to enhance their chance of being 
hired in the future by the client firm for both pay and non-pay related services. Critics thus 
argue that by providing favorable advice, pay consultants help ratcheting up executive pay. 
                                                 
22 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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However, according to the critical resource dependency theory, the bidding up of CEO pay 
may not necessarily harm shareholders’ interests in the presence of competition for 
managerial talents. 
 
Availability of data on compensation consultants has created a growing interest among 
academics to investigate the influence of compensation consultants on CEO pay. A few 
studies show that CEOs of firms that use compensation consultants receive higher pay relative 
to those who do not employ a consultant. The interesting issue that has not yet been examined 
is: why did some firms use two or more pay consultants? How firms benefit from employing 
multiple pay consultants and consultants with large market shares?  
 
To address these research questions, an original hand-collected dataset of UK firms for the 
period 2003–2006 is analyzed. We find that almost all UK firms in our sample seek 
recommendations from compensation consultants, and the majority of the sample firms use 
multiple pay consultants. We gather from the literature that firms use two or more pay 
consultants in order to help them to better justify higher CEO pay in their effort to attract or 
retain CEOs with the required talents to run the firms successfully. The positive relation 
between the number of pay consultants and CEO equity-based pay documented in our study 
lends support for this conjecture because equity-based pay such as stock options has been 
recognized in the literature as an efficient mechanism in matching managerial pay and talent. 
The findings from both bivariate and multivariate analyses suggest that CEOs have benefited 
by means of securing higher equity-based pay from employing multiple pay consultants. 
 
Our study also demonstrates that firms’ CEOs have benefited in a similar way by employing 
compensation consultant with larger market shares. This is particularly true for two 
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consultants with the largest market shares (i.e. New Bridge Street and Towers Perrin). In 
unreported additional analysis, we find that firms that pay higher compensation to CEOs (but 
not necessarily larger firms) tend to choose consultants with larger market shares. Although 
some scholars may argue that compensation consultants might have intentionally advised 
towards higher CEO pay in order to secure their business interests with client firms, we would 
rather view this finding as the unintended outcome of competition among compensation 
consultants. In this regard, it is important to explore the complexities of the pressures and 
processes confronting pay consultants in the determination of CEO pay instead of fuelling a 
“blame game”. 
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
Variable Name Definitions  
CEO compensation  
Total compensation The sum of salary, bonus, benefit, defined-benefit pension 
increment, the value of restricted stock grant and stock option grant. 
Equity-based compensation The sum of the value of restricted stock grants and stock option 
grants. 
Variable compensation  The sum of bonus, pension increment, the values of restricted stock 
grants and stock option grants. 
  
Compensation consultants  
Consultants The natural logarithm of the total number of compensation 
consultants. 
Market share The number of compensation consulting contracts a consulting firm 
has secured divided by the total number of compensation consulting 
contracts in the market. 
  
Firm characteristics  
Stock return The natural logarithm of change over the financial year of a firm’s 
dividend adjusted share price index. 
Firm size The natural logarithm of sales. 
Firm risk  The standard deviation of annualised monthly stock return over 
prior 120-months.  
  
Governance characteristics   
Board size The natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board. 
Non-executives The number of non-executive directors divided by the number of 
executive directors. 
RemCo Size  The natural logarithm of total number of remuneration committee 
members. 
Institutional ownership The percentage of total institutional ownership that is greater than 
three per cent. 
CEO duality A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chair of the 
Board, zero otherwise. 
  
CEO characteristics  
CEO age The natural logarithm of CEO age. 
CEO tenure The natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has held the 
position of CEO at the firm. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Firm-level statistics 
 
 Mean Median Min. Max. St. dev. 
Total compensation (£m) 1.94 1.40 0.15 22.79 1.85 
Equity-based compensation (£m) 0.73 0.37 0.00 20.37 1.31 
Variable compensation (£m) 1.36 0.89 0.00 21.93 1.69 
Stock return 0.14 0.17 -2.29 1.03 0.29 
Sales (£mil) 4,405 1,331 20 155,000 11,900 
Firm risk 0.33 0.32 0.01 0.94 0.12 
No. of compensation consultants 2 2 1 8 1 
No. of board members 10 10 5 21 2 
Non-executives/executives ratio 2 1 0 8 1 
No. of RemCo members 4 4 2 8 1 
Institutional ownership 0.27 0.21 0.00 0.74 0.14 
CEO age (years) 53 54 31 69 6 
CEO tenure (years) 6 4 1 34 6 
 
The panel reports the descriptive statistics of variable for the sample of 175 non-financial UK firms. 
The sample period is from 2003 to 2006 (700 firm-years). All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
Panel B: Compensation consultant statistics 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total firm-
years 
% of 
total 
Number of consultants       
1 82 76 76 77 311 44.4 
2 50 53 49 51 203 29.0 
3 28 25 31 29 113 16.1 
4 11 13 17 12 53  7.6 
5 or more 4 8 2 6 20  2.9 
Total 175 175 175 175 700 100.0 
       
Name of the consultant       
New Bridge Street 55 64 60 68 247 17.9 
Towers Perrin 57 54 51 46 208 15.1 
Mercer 28 28 26 23 105 7.6 
Monks 30 26 19 20 95 6.9 
Deloitte 20 23 23 23 89 6.4 
Watson Wyatt 23 21 22 23 89 6.4 
Others 120 140 146 143 549 39.7 
Total 333 356 347 346 1382 100.0 
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Table 2. Compensation consultants and CEO pay 
Panel A: Number of consultants and CEO pay (£000) 
 Salary  Equity-based 
compensation 
Variable 
Compensation 
Total 
Compensation 
One consultant (N = 311) 
Mean 488 544 1120 1658 
Median 440 313 751 1239 
St. dev. 190 796 1145 1314 
Two consultants (N = 203) 
Mean 521** 624 1199 1779 
Median 468** 396 879 1391 
St. dev. 207 959 1258 1461 
Three consultants (N = 113) 
Mean 538 985** 1675** 2274* 
Median 503 524** 999** 1583** 
St. dev. 182 2159 2421 2513 
Four consultants (N = 53) 
Mean 595* 1221 2026 2673 
Median 558 594 1454 2046 
St. dev. 252 1857 2552 2752 
More than four consultants (N = 20) 
Mean 741** 1811 3222 4071* 
Median 773** 1107 2563 3615** 
St. dev. 238 1868 2940 3020 
 
Panel B: Changes in the number of consultants and CEO pay 
 Change in 
Salary  
Change in 
Equity-based 
Compensation 
Change in 
Variable 
Compensation 
Change in 
Total 
Compensation 
No change in the number of consultants used (N = 350) 
Mean 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.007 
Median 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.016 
St. dev. 0.012 0.123 0.135 0.152 
Increase in the number of consultants used (N = 93) 
Mean 0.005 0.065*** 0.075*** 0.085*** 
Median 0.005* 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.044*** 
St. dev. 0.009 0.304 0.310 0.320 
Decrease in the number of consultants used (N = 82) 
Mean 0.005 -0.009 -0.002 0.008 
Median 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.025 
St. dev. 0.008 0.344 0.344 0.346 
 
The table reports mean, median and standard deviation of CEO compensation. Panel A presents 
compensation for firms categorized according to the number of consultants used. Panel B presents percentage 
change in compensation associated with change / no change in the number of consultants used. The sample 
consists of 175 non-financial UK firms during 2003–06. 
  *   Statistical significance at 10% level. 
**   Statistical significance at 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
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Table 3. The number of compensation consultants and CEO pay 
Variable 
 
Equity-based compensation Total compensation 
Pooled 
regression
(1) 
Random 
effects 
regression
(2) 
Pooled 
regression
(3) 
Random 
effects 
regression 
(4)  
Intercept -2.010* -1.363 2.531*** 2.693 *** 
 (0.071) (0.352) (0.000) (0.000)  
Consultants 0.303* 0.342* 0.051 0.043  
 (0.083) (0.072) (0.416) (0.538)  
Stock return 0.944*** 0.838*** 0.281*** 0.249 *** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)  
Firm size 0.155* 0.178* 0.186*** 0.181 *** 
 (0.060) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000)  
Board size 2.331*** 1.870*** 0.801*** 0.776 *** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)  
Non-executives -0.107 -0.131 0.072*** 0.029  
 (0.404) (0.0389) (0.005) (0.315)  
Institutional ownership -0.011 -0.005 -0.014*** -0.009 * 
 (0.048) (0.606) (0.001) (0.059)  
CEO duality -1.189*** -0.989** -0.494*** -0.451 *** 
 (0.003) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000)  
CEO tenure 0.15 0.279*** 0.093*** 0.098 *** 
 (0.115) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001)  
      
Adj. R2 0.11 0.14 0.31 0.44  
 
The table presents the results for pooled and random effects regressions. The dependent variables are CEO 
equity-based compensation and total compensation, expressed in the natural logarithm of their values. The 
sample consists of 175 non-financial firms during 2003–06 (700 firm-years). All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
  *   Statistical significance at 10% level. 
**   Statistical significance at 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
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Table 4. Changes in compensation consultants and CEO pay 
Variable 
 
 
Equity-based 
compensation 
  
Total 
compensation 
  
Pooled 
regression 
(1) 
  
    Random 
    effects 
    regression
     (2) 
  
Pooled 
regression
(3) 
  
Random 
effects 
regression 
(4) 
  
Intercept -0.152 0.170 0.209 0.239 
 (0.540) (0.414) (0.408) (0.266) 
Increase in consultants 0.053* 0.058** 0.066** 0.069*** 
 (0.104) (0.039) (0.053) (0.021) 
Decrease in consultants -0.012 -0.013 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.741) (0.704) (0.960) (0.895) 
Lag compensation -0.079*** -0.078*** -0.110*** -0.109*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock return 0.085** 0.180** 0.112*** 0.102** 
 (0.036) (0.055) (0.014) (0.028) 
Firm size 0.019** 0.019*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
Board size 0.047  0.047  0.073* 0.078* 
 (0.223) (0.261) (0.076) (0.082) 
Non-executives -0.001  0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.973) (0.921) (0.802) (0.904) 
Institutional ownership -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.217) (0.088) (0.328) (0.229) 
CEO duality -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.084*** -0.089*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO tenure  0.001  0.001  0.003 0.003 
 (0.709) (0.731) (0.251) (0.265) 
     
Adj. R2 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09 
 
The table presents the results for pooled and random effects regressions. The dependent variables are CEO 
equity-based compensation and total compensation, expressed in the natural logarithm of their values. The 
sample consists of 175 non-financial firms during 2003–06. Calculating year-to-year change in compensation 
consultant results in 525 firm-year observations. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The p-values are 
reported in parentheses. 
  *   Statistical significance at 10% level. 
**   Statistical significance at 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
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Table 5. Market share of compensation consultants and CEO pay 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Equity-based compensation Total compensation 
Pooled 
regression 
 
(1) 
 
Random 
effects 
regression 
(2) 
 
    Pooled 
    regression 
 
    (3) 
 
        Random 
        effects 
        regression 
        (4) 
 
Intercept 1.520 1.530 4.796*** 4.451*** 
 (0.269) (0.426) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market share 0.156** 0.125 0.041*** 0.017 
 (0.025) (0.115) (0.005) (0.311) 
Non-executives 0.371** 0.383* 0.130*** 0.076 
 (0.032) (0.059) (0.000) (0.117) 
Institutional ownership 0.016 -0.000 -0.008*** -0.010*** 
 (0.290) (0.960) (0.004) (0.000) 
CEO duality -1.328** -1.358* -0.240 -0.096 
 (0.033) (0.052) (0.143) 0.551 
Firm size 0.230*** 0.229* 0.159*** 0.185*** 
 (0.009) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Adj. R2 0.08 0.08 0.25 0.23 
         
The table presents the results for pooled and random effects regressions. The dependent 
variables are CEO equity-based compensation and total compensation, expressed in the 
natural logarithm of their values. The market share of a consultant is estimated by 
considering firms with only one consultant (311 firm-year observations). All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. The p-values are in parentheses. 
  *   Statistical significance at 10% level. 
**   Statistical significance at 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
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Table 6. The two largest compensation consultants and CEO pay 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Equity-based compensation 
 
Total compensation 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
       
Intercept -2.028 -1.172 -1.558 3.315*** 3.669*** 3.592*** 
 (0.248) (0.508) (0.376) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
New Bridge Street 0.545 *  0.703** 0.048  0.141* 
 (0.074)  (0.025) (0.514)  (0.052) 
Towers Perrin  0.575 0.808*  0.429*** 0.476*** 
  (0.179) (0.069)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.101 0.062 0.072 0.119*** 0.100*** 0.102*** 
 (0.376) (0.594) (0.533) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Board size 2.445 *** 2.248*** 2.194*** 0.857*** 0.719*** 0.709*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Non-executives 0.376 * 0.360* 0.395** 0.109*** 0.114*** 0.121*** 
 (0.062) (0.078) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional ownership -0.011 * -0.004 0.004 -0.013* -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.603) (0.860) (0.867) (0.065) (0.379) (0.538) 
CEO duality -1.115 ** -1.179 -1.123** -0.263* -0.279** -0.268** 
 (0.049) (0.037) (0.037) (0.088) (0.049) (0.049) 
CEO tenure -0.360 *** -0.389*** -0.345*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.093*** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
       
Adj. R2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.32 0.37 0.38 
 
The table presents the results for pooled regressions. The dependent variables are CEO equity-based 
compensation and total compensation, expressed in the natural logarithm of their values. The sample includes 
firms with only one consultant (311 firm-year observations). The two largest consultants (New Bridge Street 
and Towers Perrin) are identified based on their market shares and expressed as dummy variables. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. The p-values are in parentheses. 
  *   Statistical significance at 10% level. 
**   Statistical significance at 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
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Table 7: Estimation results controlling for the endogeneity of multiple compensation 
consultants and consultant market share  
 
 
 
Multiple compensation consultants 
  
Compensation consultant market share 
  
 OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  
Variable 
 
Multiple  
consultants
  
Equity-based
pay  
  
Total pay
 
  
Consultant 
market share
  
Equity-based 
pay  
  
Total pay
 
  
 
(1) 
  
(2) 
  
(3) 
  
(4) 
  
(5) 
  
(6) 
  
Intercept -1.438*** -0.817 4.062*** -5.687 -0.602 2.252***
 (0.000) (0.386) (0.000) (0.168) (0.796) (0.000) 
Consultants  1.201** 0.546***    
  (0.032) (0.001)    
Market share     0.429* 0.113** 
     (0.065) (0.029) 
Stock return  1.119*** 0.334*** 0.338   
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.562)   
Firm size 0.092***    0.025 0.074** 
 (0.00)    (0.853) (0.021) 
Firm risk 0.993***   -3.542**   
 (0.000)   (0.012)   
Board size  2.384*** 1.239***  2.091*** 0.885***
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.000) 
RemCo size 0.286***   -0.556   
 (0.000)   (0.257)   
Non-executives     0.416** 0.118***
     (0.042) (0.000) 
Institutional ownership -0.015***   -0.117***   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
CEO duality  -1.205*** -0.464*** -1.012*   
  (0.002) (0.000) (0.061)   
CEO tenure -0.032*   -0.240*   
 (0.092)   (0.078)   
CEO age 0.250   1.142   
 (0.116)   (0.277)   
       
Adj. R2 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.28 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation method is two-stage least squares estimation 
(2SLS). The OLS columns represent the results of the first stage regression. The sample period is from 2003 
to 2006 with 700 firm-year observations used for Columns 1 - 3 and 311 firm-year observations used for 
Columns 4 - 6. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The p-values are in parentheses. 
  *   Statistical significance at 10% level. 
**   Statistical significance at 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
 
